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Abstract

Economic theories of legal compliance emphasize legal sanctions, while psychological and sociological theories stress the perceived legitimacy of law. Without
disputing the importance of either mechanism, we test a third way that law affects behavior, an expressive theory that claims law influences behavior by creating a focal point around which individuals coordinate. The focal point theory
makes three claims: (1) that the need for coordination is pervasive because “mixed
motive” games involving coordination model common disputes; (2) that, in such
games, any third-party cheap talk that calls the players’ attention to a particular equilibrium tends to produce that equilibrium; and (3) that law, by publicly
endorsing a particular equilibrium, tends to call the players’ attention to that outcome. After explaining the first and third claim, we offer an experimental test of
the second. Specifically, we investigated how various forms of third party cheap
talk influence the behavior of subjects in a Hawk/Dove or Chicken game. Despite the players’ conflicting interests, we found that messages highlighting one
equilibrium tend to produce that outcome. This result emerged when the message
was selected by an overtly random, mechanical process, and also when it was delivered by a third-party subject; the latter effect was significantly stronger than
the former only when the subject speaker was selected by a merit-based process.
These results suggest that, in certain circumstances, law generates compliance not
only by sanctions and legitimacy, but also by facilitating coordination around a
focal outcome.

Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance:
Expressive Influence in an Experimental Hawk/Dove Game
Richard H. McAdams
rmcadams@law.uiuc.edu
(before Aug. 30, 2003 and after May 10, 2004)
(Sept. 1, 2003 to May 10, 2004)
University of Illinois College of Law
Yale Law School
504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
127 Wall Street
Champaign, IL 61820
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
(217) 333-4385
(203) 436-4603
Janice Nadler
jnadler@northwestern.edu
American Bar Foundation & Northwestern University School of Law
357 E. Chicago Avenue
Chicago, IL 60611
312-503-3228
Revised Version – July 2003
ABSTRACT
Economic theories of legal compliance emphasize legal sanctions, while psychological
and sociological theories stress the perceived legitimacy of law. Without disputing the
importance of either mechanism, we test a third way that law affects behavior, an expressive
theory that claims law influences behavior by creating a focal point around which individuals
coordinate. The focal point theory makes three claims: (1) that the need for coordination is
pervasive because “mixed motive” games involving coordination model common disputes; (2)
that, in such games, any third-party cheap talk that calls the players’ attention to a particular
equilibrium tends to produce that equilibrium; and (3) that law, by publicly endorsing a particular
equilibrium, tends to call the players’ attention to that outcome. After explaining the first and
third claim, we offer an experimental test of the second. Specifically, we investigated how
various forms of third party cheap talk influence the behavior of subjects in a Hawk/Dove or
Chicken game. Despite the players’ conflicting interests, we found that messages highlighting
one equilibrium tend to produce that outcome. This result emerged when the message was
selected by an overtly random, mechanical process, and also when it was delivered by a thirdparty subject; the latter effect was significantly stronger than the former only when the subject
speaker was selected by a merit-based process. These results suggest that, in certain
circumstances, law generates compliance not only by sanctions and legitimacy, but also by
facilitating coordination around a focal outcome.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Chwe (2001) explains social rituals by their ability to generate the common knowledge
needed to solve a coordination game. He gives many examples of how rituals work as “common
knowledge generators,” including those that publicize the power and authority of the state. But
Chwe omits what we think is one of the more interesting examples of his theory: the ritual of
law. While law-and-economics theorists tend to view law as facilitating cooperation, we believe
that another important but neglected function of law is to generate the common knowledge
necessary for individuals to coordinate. Because of the publicity commonly given to and
expected for law, legal pronouncements can create common knowledge about governmental
expectations. Even aside from the sanctions government may use to enforce its expectations, the
mere knowledge of legal pronouncements will often create a “focal point” that influences the
behavior of individuals in a coordination game. Broadcasting the legal rule “drive on the right,”
for example, is likely to prompt compliance independent of the threat of legal sanctions.
It is exceedingly easy to overlook this coordinating power of law. One reason is that two
other explanations have long dominated theory and empiricism on the subject of legal
compliance. Most economic analysis assumes that sanctions are the sole mechanism by which
law achieves compliance (via deterrence or incapacitation), while most psychological and
sociological theories emphasize the perceived legitimacy of law as the primary explanation for
compliance (via social and institutional reinforcement of moral norms). The debate between
these camps obscures the possibility of any alternative. In addition, the common joinder of law
with sanctions and legitimacy makes it extraordinarily difficult to discern whether law has a
power independent of these forces. Finally, even if one is prepared to look beyond the two
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prevailing theories, the problem of coordinating among multiple equilibria stands a bit outside
the mainstream of game theory that is applied to law. Indeed, many law-and-economics scholars
think of coordination as relevant to only a narrow domain of social life that does not include the
conflict that law seeks to resolve.
Despite this resistance, a few theorists have offered coordination as another mechanism
for generating legal compliance, a third reason why people obey the law (Cooter 1998; Hay &
Shleifer 1998, p.400-401; Lessig 1995, p.1016; Posner 2000, p.177-79; McAdams 2001a). These
coordination explanations employ rational choice tools, and, like other economic theories, avoid
complex notions of legitimacy. Despite these differences from psychological and sociological
approaches, however, coordination theories similarly conclude that law can generate some
compliance expressively, apart from its sanctions.1 Without denying the power of sanctions or
legitimacy, the coordination explanation claims that law influences behavior independently of
either.
There has, however, been little empirical testing of these novel theories. Though several
experiments document the power of recommendations in “conflict-free” coordination games
(where subjects agree on what equilibrium is best), law commonly addresses coordination
situations with genuine conflict (where subjects rank the equilibria differently). There has been
almost no testing of the claim that mere “cheap talk” from third parties can influence behavior in
such games. To remedy this gap, we conducted an experiment to examine whether and how
cheap talk messages influence play in a Hawk/Dove Game. Here, we present our findings, which
1

There are also rational choice explanations of the expressive power of law that do not rely on coordination. E.g.
Dharmapala & McAdams 2003; Funk 2002; Kahan 2000; McAdams 2000b. And, of course, there are theories of the
law’s expressive effect that do not rely on rational choice. See Nadler 2002, Robinson & Darley 1997, Sunstein
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support the claim that third-party expression can by itself influence behavior in coordination
situations that model legal disputes. We emphasize two points about the relationship of the
current study to the larger topic of legal compliance. First, by testing an expressive theory, we do
not imply a rejection of compliance theories that emphasize sanctions or legitimacy. Second, by
testing a coordination theory, we do not imply a rejection of other expressive theories. Indeed, we
identify below the limited domain in which coordination theories apply.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II sets forth the coordination explanation of
expressive law, particularly the “focal point” theory. Section III reviews the relevant empirical
literature on the subject. Section IV describes our experiment. Section V concludes.
II. COORDINATION THEORIES OF EXPRESSIVE LAW
A. Background on Coordination Games and Focal Points
Coordination theories of expressive law apply only in situations of multiple equilibria.
Most law-and-economics analysis considers the problem of multiple equilibria only as it arises in
iterated versions of the n-person prisoners’ dilemma. But the need to coordinate among multiple
equilibria is more general. A common illustration of a pure coordination game is the choice
between driving on the left or right side of the road. There are two pure strategy equilibria with
identical payoffs – where everyone drives on the left and where everyone drives on the right. But
the fact that all individuals share some interest in avoiding the non-coordinated outcome – where
some drive left and others right – does not guarantee coordination.
Games with multiple equilibria provide a useful context for studying expressive effects

1996.
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because, by definition, a player’s choice of strategy is not fully determined by the payoffs.
Instead, Schelling (1960) observed that any feature of a coordination equilibrium that draws
attention to itself, making it “stand out” among the equilibria, will tend to produce self-fulfilling
expectations that this salient equilibrium will result. Players tend to select an equilibrium that is
“unique” in some non-payoff dimension merely because that uniqueness, when sufficiently plain,
causes each player to expect every player to focus on it. For example, Schelling asked New
Haven residents to name the place and time they would meet someone in New York City on a
given day, if they had failed to communicate more specifically on the subject. Though there is an
extremely large number of possibilities, over half the individuals named the same place – Grand
Central Station – and almost everyone named the same time – noon. Later experiments confirm
that, where nothing in the mathematical structure of the game favors any single outcome, a nonpayoff feature that makes one equilibrium psychologically “focal” tends to cause individuals to
choose the strategy that produces that equilibrium. (See Mehta et al. 1994).
In pure coordination games, the simplest way to create a focal point is by communication
and agreement. Many experiments demonstrate that the players can increase their level of
coordination in such games by engaging in “cheap talk”: costless, non-binding, and nonverifiable communication. (Crawford 1998 provides a review.) Schelling (1960), however, was
interested in cases where the individuals could not communicate and/or could not agree. In such
cases, he claimed, a third party could create a focal point merely by suggesting a possible
solution. His example of third-party influence in a pure coordination game was a prominent sign
posted throughout a department store that suggests where lost parties should reunite. Even
though parties may not have agreed in advance to follow the sign’s suggestion, we can imagine
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that, once lost, they would gladly obey it.
For law, however, the crucial question is whether third-party suggestions can influence
behavior outside of pure coordination games. Games of pure coordination (such as the choice
between driving on the left or right or where to meet when lost) are rare. Their rarity probably
explains why theorists slight the value of coordination to law. But an element of coordination is
present in common situations that Schelling called “mixed motive” games. In games such as
Hawk/Dove (discussed below), each player prefers every equilibrium outcome to at least one
non-equilibrium outcome, but individuals rank the equilibria differently. Thus, there is conflict
because one individual’s favored equilibrium is another individual’s disfavored equilibrium. But
there is a shared interest in coordinating to avoid a non-equilibrium outcome.
With mixed motive games, it is less certain that communication between players will
facilitate coordination (because each individual may use cheap talk merely to insist upon his or
her own preferred outcome). Schelling claimed, however, that third-party cheap talk could still
provide a solution to such games. He offers this example: imagine the effect of a bystander who
steps into an intersection to direct traffic when the traffic light is broken. Drivers approaching an
intersection on different roads each want to coordinate to avoid a collision, but each prefers to
proceed immediately through the intersection while the other waits. Schelling posits that drivers
will tend to obey the hand signals of the bystander, that is, that this third-party’s expression will
influence behavior even though, as cheap talk, it does not change the payoffs of the individuals in
the game.
B. The Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law
McAdams (2000a) claims that law is a type of third-party cheap talk capable of
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constructing a focal point around which individuals then coordinate. Like Schelling’s department
store sign for lost shoppers, a legal pronouncement “Drive on the left” can, merely by calling
attention to one equilibrium, cause that outcome to stand out from the other, thus raising the
probability that individuals will expect others to drive on the left, and thereby inducing everyone
to drive on the left, all independent of the threat of sanctions. More importantly, McAdams
claims that third-party cheap talk works not only in pure coordination games, but also in mixed
motive coordination situations. Here, law works as Schelling’s bystander-in-the-intersection
directs traffic. By making one outcome salient, legal rules and judgments can guide expectations
toward that outcome and influence behavior independent of sanctions. Thus, McAdams
controversially claims that legal expression can, by itself, influence the behavior of parties to a
dispute.
The focal point theory then relies on three empirical claims. The first is that the need for
coordination is pervasive because mixed motive games plausibly model common social conflict.
The second claim is that, in such games, any third-party expression that calls the players’
attention to a particular equilibrium tends to produce that equilibrium. The third claim is that law,
by publicly endorsing a particular equilibrium, tends to call the players’ attention to that
outcome. As we explain below, our experiment tests the second of these claims – that salient
third-party expression influences behavior in these games. In this section, we explain further the
first and third claims, so as to establish the practical relevance of proving the second.
Taking the last point first, McAdams (2000a) claims that law frequently creates
widespread publicity for a particular outcome. Law does not always make a required behavior
salient, but it often does. We think the claim sufficiently plausible to merit little comment, except
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to note the parallel to Chwe’s analysis of ritual. The simplest way to create common knowledge
among a population is a ritual attended by the entire population. But Chwe (2001) identifies
various mechanisms to create common knowledge among a physically dispersed population. (See
Chwe 2001, p. 23 (new regime’s units of weights and measures), p. 37-60 (advertising), p. 91-92
(morning newspaper)). McAdams’ claim is that law often works in the same way. Among the
many public messages that compete for individuals’ attention, law is typically among the most
salient. The processes of creating law and adjudicating legal disputes are public and publicized
rituals that can generate common knowledge (of the government’s expectation of certain
conduct), making salient the outcome the law prescribes.2
None of this would matter if the need for coordination were rare. To the contrary,
however, we contend that much social conflict can be modeled as a mixed motive game
involving an element of coordination. There are many such games, but we illustrate the general
point with one example: the Hawk/Dove or Chicken game. Here, each player chooses between an
aggressive strategy – “Hawk” – where one insists on getting one’s way – and a passive strategy –
“Dove” – where one defers to others. In a two-person version, the game is Hawk/Dove when
both players rank the four possible outcomes as follows, starting with the best: (1) playing Hawk
against Dove; (2) playing Dove against Dove; (3) playing Dove against Hawk; and (4) playing
Hawk against Hawk. The pure strategy equilibria are Hawk/Dove and Dove/Hawk. Figure 1
illustrates. Strategy 1 represents Dove and Strategy 2 represents Hawk.

2

Other types of expression can produce the same effects. Indeed, law competes with non-legal expression with
varying results. McAdams 2000a notes three reasons law is often more influential than competing expression: law is
frequently more publicized; the perceived legitimacy of law can make its message “stand out” among other
messages; and that, because of the first two effects, legal actors may enjoy a reputation for solving coordination
problems, by having accurately forecasted in past cases which equilibrium would emerge.
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Figure 1: A Hawk/Dove or Chicken Game
Hawk/Dove ($HD”) models disputes in the following way: When Hawk is played against
Dove, the player using the aggressive strategy gains a disputed resource and the other player
receives nothing. When Dove is played against Dove, the players divide the resource or allocate
it randomly between themselves. When Hawk is played against Hawk, the players “clash” in
some costly way. The alternative name for the game, “Chicken,” comes from an example where
teenagers competing for honor drive their cars directly at each other to see who will “chicken
out”; the outcome of two aggressive strategies is a head-on collision. Schelling’s cross-roads
example is more common. Drivers approaching an intersection from different roads each prefer
to proceed first without slowing down, but each realizes that they will collide in the middle if
neither slows down.
More generally, a HD game models a dispute if we imagine that the Hawk/Hawk
outcome represents a physical fight, mutually embarrassing shouting match, or other costly
conflict. Although the outcome of Hawk/Hawk for each player is uncertain – one might win or
lose the “fight” – the expected value is the worst possible outcome for both players because the
cost of fighting is high relative to the value of the disputed resource. This condition is an
important limitation: when one or more players value the object in dispute highly enough relative
to the costs of “fighting” (because a player values the object so highly or expects to incur so few
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costs from fighting), then the game has only one equilibrium and no element of coordination.
But the condition that fighting be mutually regarded as the worst outcome is plausibly
satisfied for many disputes. Two neighbors may dispute the precise location of the boundary
between their land. It is not hard to imagine that, while each desires the disputed sliver of land,
each recognizes that the result of both insisting on their preference is violence that each expects
to be more costly than giving in to the preference of the other. Similarly, two individuals sitting
in a public place may dispute over whether one of them may light a cigarette. Though each
prefers to get his or her way, we can imagine that each expects that the result of both insisting on
his or her preference will be a heated row that is worse than giving in to the other. In many
disputes, the coordination aspect is that both players wish to avoid Hawk/Hawk. But conflict
remains because the players each prefer to play Hawk to the other’s Dove.
HD is one of the simplest games of this form,3 but more complex games capture nuances
omitted from the above examples. For example, a single dispute may involve a number of stages
of escalating conflict leading up to a final HD game. Or a dispute may involve an indefinite
number of rounds, each of which is costly for each player, with the winner being the one willing
to stay in the game the longest. (Regarding this “war of attrition” game, see Fudenburg & Tirole
1991; Sugden 1986). Or certain disputes may recur among players who recognize each other, so
that they seek in each round to establish a reputation for playing Hawk in future rounds. The key
point is that a great many of these games have multiple equilibria where the players mutually
prefer to avoid outcomes of the most costly conflict. Thus, in various disputes, there remains an
element of coordination. Because the players’ strategy choice then depends on expectations not
3

Another simple example is the Battle of the Sexes game. See Baird, Gertner & Picker (1994, p. 41-42, 302).
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entirely determined by the payoffs, there is room for expressive influence.
We assume, therefore, that the law frequently addresses mixed situations of coordination
and conflict, and that law frequently makes one equilibrium in such games salient. Now we turn
to the final empirical claim: that in these situations, third-party cheap talk (including law) can
influence behavior merely by making one outcome salient.
III. THE EFFECT OF EXPRESSION ON COORDINATION: EXISTING LITERATURE
When Schelling (1960) introduced the idea of focal points, he emphasized that this aspect
of game theory was inherently empirical, dependent as it is on the shared knowledge and cultural
understandings of those in the game. As noted above, plenty of research demonstrates that cheap
talk between the players in a coordination game will influence the players’ behavior. (See Valley,
et al. 2002; Crawford 1998; Matthews & Postlewaite 1989). More to the point, some experiments
also establish that third-party expression can influence behavior in certain coordination
situations. (See Bohnet & Cooter 2001; Brandts & MacLeod 1995; Brandts & Holt 1992;
Chaudhuri & Graziano 2003; Croson & Marks 2001; Schotter & Sopher 2003; Tyran and Feld
2002; Van Huyck et al. 1992; Wilson & Rhodes 1997). Yet, for two reasons, the existing
literature is not entirely adequate to assess whether or how third-party expression influences
behavior in the type of situations that law addresses.
The first limitation is the nature of the games employed in existing experiments. As noted
above, law frequently addresses conflict. There may be no conflict ex ante – prior to a dispute –
when everyone expects to benefit from an efficient legal rule. But the question of legal
compliance arises ex post – after a dispute arises – when obeying law involves one party

11
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“winning” and another “losing.” The HD game is useful for modeling such a dispute. But there
are no existing experiments testing third-party expression in conflict-intensive HD game. Rather
than games mixing conflict and coordination, most experiments examining the effect of thirdparty expression use either pure coordination games, (Wilson & Rhodes 1997, Van Huyck et al.
1992) (game “A”), or games with symmetrical equilibria where the individuals agree on which
equilibria is best. (Bohnet & Cooter 2001; Chaudhuri & Graziano 2003; Van Huyck et al. 1992)
(game “B”). Where other mixed games are used, they are too complex to model legal disputes,
arising in experiments intended to test abstract theories of equilibrium refinement. (See Brandts
& McLeod 1995; Brandts & Holt 1992). The one exception is the inter-generational Battle of the
Sexes game in Schotter & Sopher (2003), which we discuss below.
The second limitation in existing research is the manner in which the experiments model
expression. We think it desirable to break down expression into various components, beginning
with the most minimal, and then to determine the contribution each component makes. In
particular, the most basic thing expression can do is simply to call attention to a particular
outcome; so it would be desirable to know whether this “ostensive” feature exhausts the effect of
expression, or whether other features (discussed below) make an important contribution. Yet all
existing experiments treat third-party “expression” as an undifferentiated whole.4
A few studies merit further discussion. Two explicitly aim to study the expressive effect
of law. Bohnet & Cooter (2001) had subjects play a multi-person game similar to “stag hunt” or

4

Moreover, in most research, the experimenter merely reads the suggestion to the subjects, increasing the possibility
of demand characteristics, where subjects comply in an effort to please the experimenter. In the experiment reported
here, we instead attempt to carefully involve the subjects in the delivery of messages, following Wilson & Rhodes
1997, Schotter & Sopher 2003, and Tyran & Feld 2002.
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“assurance,”5 where subjects each choose between strategy “L” and “R.” In the control condition,
many groups failed to achieve the Pareto-optimal equilibrium, in which everyone plays R. In the
expressive condition, the payoff for the Pareto-inferior strategy (L) was raised by 20 cents, but
this change was offset by a 10% probability that anyone playing this strategy would be
“punished” by 200 cents. Bohnet & Cooter found significantly greater play of the Pareto-optimal
strategy in this “penalty” condition, even though the expected payoff values of the two strategies
are exactly the same as the corresponding strategies in the control condition.
Tyran & Feld (2002) had groups of three subjects play a public goods game. Subjects
decided whether to contribute to a public good, where withholding (not contributing) always
generated a higher material payoff for an individual than contributing (no matter what other
subjects did). In some conditions, subjects voted on a “deduction” rule, knowing that, if a
majority voted for the rule, the payoffs for withholding would decline by a certain amount. In one
such condition – “mild law” – the deduction was sufficiently small that an individual would still
always be materially better off withholding than contributing. Contrary to economic prediction,
there was some contribution in all conditions. But in the mild law condition, individual
contributions were three times higher than either the control condition (with no deduction) or a
condition where the same deduction rule was imposed exogenously, without a vote.
Both experiments demonstrate the potential for experimentally testing the effect of legal
expression on behavior. But neither study uses the HD or similar game and neither disaggregates
the components of expression. First, Bohnet & Cooter (2001) explicitly test expression in a

5

Baird, Gertner & Picker (1994) define the related games of assurance and stag hunt at pp. 301 & 315, respectively.
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setting like an assurance game, where all players prefer the same equilibrium.6 Tyran and Feld
(2002) offer what seems to be a more strenuous test by using a public goods game where the
material payoffs should compel a single behavior contrary to the expression. But we follow
Farrell & Rubin (1996, p.113 n.14) in believing that non-material payoffs can change the nature
of such games. Considerable evidence suggests that, when material payoffs appear to create a
single equilibrium (such as zero contribution), some individuals cooperate because they directly
gain utility from reciprocating the other subjects’ strategy and/or producing a “fair” outcome.
(E.g., Fehr, Fishbacher & Gachter 2002; Heinrich et al. 2001, McCabe, Rassenti & Smith 1998).
If so, then the total payoffs may create an assurance game; these individuals want to contribute if
others contribute, but to withhold if others withhold. It is difficult otherwise to explain the
contributions Tyran & Feld observed. But if some subjects were playing an assurance game, the
knowledge that a majority voted for a deduction rule would encourage contributions because an
individual’s vote for the rule suggests an intent to contribute (if one is not going to contribute,
one is better off without the deduction).
Consider more precisely why the differences between these games matter. In the
experiments using the assurance game (or similar games where the players give equilibria the
same rank), the expression encourages behavior that will, if all players comply, increase the
expected return of all players.7 This point is true both before and after the players receive the
message: even after receiving the message, each player prefers complying with the message if

6

In the game, the players rank the two pure strategy equilibria in the same way. They may fail to reach the Paretooptimal outcome (all R) because the associated strategy (R) is riskier (choosing R when most others choose L pays
less than choosing L when most others pick R).

7

Of course, because the recommended strategy is riskier than the alternative, there remains doubt about whether
everyone else will follow the recommendation, which makes the findings interesting.
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everyone else does. By contrast, in the HD game, it is only ex ante – before receiving the
message – that all players are better off if everyone follows whatever message they receive. Ex
post – after the third party speaks – the situation changes. As in a dispute, the expression will
identify one player as the “loser,” who plays Dove against Hawk, and is worse off if everyone
complies. To illustrate, given the Figure 1 payoffs, the mixed strategy equilibrium is for each
player to choose Hawk or Dove with equal probability. At this equilibrium, the expected payoff
for either strategy is .5.8 If the players instead correlate their strategies with a random event they
both observe, like a third party message endorsing one outcome, then they improve their expected
payoffs to 1.9 But despite this ex ante improvement, once the expression occurs, the “losing”
player expects a payoff of 0 if both players follow the expression – worse than the mixed strategy
payoff.10 This sharp ex post conflict in a HD game makes it a better model of legal disputes and a
more strenuous test of the claim that mere expression can influence behavior.
The second point about these two experiments (that explicitly aim to study expressive
law) is that they treat legal expression as an undifferentiated whole. Bohnet & Cooter (2001)
model legal expression by stating in the experiment instructions that choosing one of the
strategies (L) “will be punished” with a given probability of 10%, but exactly offsetting the
expected punishment by a general increase in the payoffs for that strategy. Unfortunately, this
approach potentially confounds at least two ways in which law may influence expectations: the
non-normative effect of simply “pointing to” a particular outcome and the normative effect of
8

At the mixed equilibrium, playing Dove produces a 50% chance of receiving 1 and a 50% chance of receiving 0,
for a net expectation of .5; playing Hawk produces a 50% chance of 2 and a 50% chance of -1, for a net of .5.
9
Everyone following a message based on a coin flip would give each player a 50% chance of earning 2 (playing
Hawk against Dove) and a 50% chance of earning 0 (playing Dove against Hawk), for a total expectation of 1.
10
One might think the loser “knows” the winner will play Hawk, which means the loser necessarily wants to play
Dove. But the winner might also “know” the loser will want to disregard the disadvantageous third party message.
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condemning an outcome by labeling part of its payoff a “punishment.” Also, embedding
normative language in the experiment instructions creates the risk that the behavioral effect
derives from the subjects’ desire to please the researchers (demand characteristics) rather than the
ability of legal expression to influence behavior.11 Tyran & Feld (2002) ingeniously use voting in
their experimental design, which certainly minimizes demand characteristics. But voting itself
consists of multiple components, including communication and legitimacy, each of which may
independently contribute to creating a focal point.12
Finally, Schotter & Sopher (2003) do not seek to study the influence of legal expression,
but they are the first to study the effects of third-party cheap talk in a game with genuine conflict.
Each of their subjects plays an inter-generational Battle of the Sexes (BOS) game for one round.
Players in generation (round) t can offer private, open-ended advice (via a computer screen) to
their own “successors” in generation (round) t + 1, where each player receives additional payoffs
based on how well his or her successor does. Schotter & Sopher find that this advice strongly
influences the players who receive it, despite the fact that the information set of the “parent” is
“virtually” the same as that of the “child,” and despite the fact that the private advice is not
common knowledge.
Though we think the HD game models a dispute more intuitively than the BOS game
Because the message is cheap talk, the outcome is entirely an empirical question.
Finally, there is the possibility that Bohnet & Cooter failed to make the penalty “non-deterring” as they suppose. If
the subjects were risk averse, they would regard the uncertainty associated with the penalty -- a 10% chance at a 200
cent fine – as worse than the expected loss of 20 cents. If so, the risky payoffs of the experimental condition may
have driven the results.

11

12

Moreover, voting for a rule may not be the appropriate model of law in a representative democracy, where citizens
usually vote for a leader who then votes for a rule, rather than voting for the rule itself. Indeed, voting may be merely
one means of making a leader legitimate, as many law-makers in a democratic society – judges, administrators, etc. –
are not directly elected.

16

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art29

(particularly the inter-generational version), Schotter & Sopher’s study importantly demonstrates
that cheap talk can influence behavior even in games of conflict. Like other experiments,
however, they do not disaggregate the components of expression. Their advice combines several
features at once: it “points to” a strategy, it represents an intentional choice by the advice-giver,
and that advice-giver presumably enjoys significant legitimacy because his or her payoff structure
is based on how well the subject does. In addition, Schotter & Sopher did not standardize the
expression being used, but allowed subjects to send open-ended messages that could include
reasons for the advice given, which may introduce different expressive features across advice.
Thus, we are left to wonder which features of the expression were strictly necessary to the result.
In sum, existing experiments do not test expression in the contexts that best model legal
disputes, and do not carefully isolate the possibly distinct components of legal expression. Given
these limitations, there is much to be learned by further study.
IV. THE EXPERIMENT
In field studies, it is extremely difficult to isolate possible causes of compliance apart
from sanctions and legitimacy, much less to identify the particular components of legal
expression that may influence behavior. Experiments therefore provide a useful starting point for
systematically examining the influence of legal expression on behavior in coordination
situations.
A. Method
1. Design
The two crucial parameters for testing the effect of expression are the strategic context
and the nature of the expression. As to context, we used a Hawk/Dove Game for the reasons
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explained above. We had the subjects play a series of one-shot HD games based on the payoffs of
Figure 1, where subjects played no more than once against any other player. As to expression, we
sought to disaggregate legal expression into its components, so as to isolate the contribution of
each. We identified three ways that legal expression might make a particular outcome focal:
ostension, intentionality, and legitimacy. First, at its most minimal level, any relevant expression
is ostensive; it “points to” and highlights a particular outcome by proclaiming it. Second,
although non-human devices are capable of “pointing to” a particular outcome, law is also
intentional -- the product of conscious human decisions. Third, actors who pronounce legal rules,
at least in a democratic society, tend to enjoy perceived legitimacy. Legitimacy may derive from
being elected, appointed by others who are elected, or something else. Because each element of
expression may plausibly contribute to the ability of law to create a focal point, we began with
the first element – ostension – and then built up towards an approximation of legal expression.13
We thus contrasted a control condition, where the subjects played the game without
receiving any expression other than the instructions, with three treatment conditions. In the first
expressive condition, intended to model the minimalist effects of ostension, the experimenter
spun a spinner before each round that would “point to” or highlight a particular equilibrium. In
the second expressive condition, intended to model the added contribution of intentionality, a
randomly selected subject identified as the “leader” recommended a particular outcome for each
round. Legitimacy is itself a complex notion with many components. In the third expressive
condition, intended to model the added contribution of only some minimal level of legitimacy, a
13

At the same time, we avoided ever using legalistic expressions about rules or penalties. We did this to avoid
demand characteristics, where the subjects infer from the expression that the experimenter desires them to behave in
a certain way. In addition, because law enjoys basic legitimacy among our subjects, we wanted to avoid terms that
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“leader” selected by merit recommended a particular outcome for each round.14 Thus, each source
of expression adds an additional expressive property to the property introduced by the previous
source of expression. The experimental design therefore consisted of one factor with four levels,
as illustrated here:
Table 1
Experimental Design
Level

Condition

Expressive Component

1

Control

None

2

Spinner

Ostension

3

Random Leader

Intentionality

4

Merit-Based
Leader

Minimal Legitimacy

2. Procedure.
In each session 10-14 subjects played about 9 rounds of the HD Game (the exact number
depended on the number of participants in the session). Subjects were randomly assigned to
expressive condition based on the session in which they participated.15 Subjects were promised a
$10 showup fee and informed at the outset that they had the opportunity to earn or lose money,
depending on their own decisions and the decisions of other participants in the session. Subjects
were informed only that the session consisted of “a series of decision making periods,” but not
the actual number. After the experimental instructions were distributed, the experimenter read
them aloud to ensure that the participants shared common knowledge of the instructions. In each

might invoke this legitimacy as a reason to comply.
14
15

We describe this selection process in detail below.
Two sessions of 10-14 participants were assigned to each of the four treatment conditions.
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round, participants were randomly paired against an anonymous and different participant and
were randomly assigned for that round to the role of “R” or “C.” Players were paired against one
another no more than once. Each counterpart was identified by a randomly assigned number, not
by name, and the subjects did not know which identification number was associated with which
player. In addition, the experimenter did not know the name of any subject.
In each round, player C had to choose between C1 (Dove) or C2 (Hawk); player R chose
between R1 (Dove) or R2 (Hawk).16 Payoffs were the same as those of Figure 1, where each
point represented $1. After each round, each subject was informed of the decision of their
“counterpart.” Any money they earned or lost was added to (or, if negative, subtracted from) their
$10 showup fee. After the last round of the game, participants completed a questionnaire
designed to assess their attitudes toward the game and to measure individual characteristics that
might have influenced their choice of strategy. Final earnings were then computed by summing
each participant’s payoffs across all rounds. The experimenter then deposited the showup fee
plus or minus the final earnings into an envelope marked with the participant’s identification
number, and placed the envelopes on a table. On their way out, each participant approached the
table one at a time, and picked up the envelope marked with their identification number.
Within each session, all subjects were assigned to the same condition. In the control
condition, the participants played the HD game without expressive influence. In the Spinner
condition, we used a spinner each round to randomly highlight one equilibrium. The base of the
spinner was divided into two equal parts, one of which read “R1/C2” and the other of which read
16

Note that although we use the designations “Hawk” and “Dove” here for purposes of describing the experiment,
we did not use these terms in any of the participants’ experimental materials.
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“R2/C1.” Before beginning the game, all participants in the Spinner condition were instructed as
follows:
Prior to each period, a spinner will be spun in view of everyone. You can see that the spinner will
either point to “R1/C2” or “R2/C1.” If you wish, you may consider the result of the spin in your
decision, in whatever manner you choose. You are also entirely free to ignore it.17

In the remaining two expressive conditions, two participants in each session were each
selected to act as a “leader” for 5 rounds of the game.18 We controlled the message that the leader
conveyed to ensure that the order of recommendations in the leader conditions exactly matched
the random order determined by the spinner in the corresponding spinner condition, thus
minimizing the error variance contributed by differences in order of messages. We kept the
instructions to the leader confidential, so that the perceived source of the message was the leader
(rather than the experimenter). This procedure helped to minimize demand characteristics
associated with the experimenter being the source of the message. To provide an incentive to
convey the correct message, leaders were paid according to how many dyads in the session
followed the message we supplied to them.
In the Random Leader condition, we explicitly used a random process to select the leader.
Before beginning the game, the experimenter instructed the subjects as follows:
You have each been given a ticket when you first arrived at the experiment. In a moment, we will
randomly select two ticket numbers from an envelope containing the numbered ticket stubs. Each
of the two participants whose ticket numbers are selected will be designated the Leader for a
portion of the session. Prior to each period, the Leader will have the opportunity to write a
message on the blackboard. If you wish, you may consider the message in your decision, in
whatever manner you choose. You are also entirely free to ignore it.

In the Merit-Based Leader condition, we attempted to confer some minimal authority on the
17

Our use of the spinner may bring to mind procedures used in a well-known experiment to demonstrate a cognitive
heuristic. See Tversky & Kahneman (1982). We discuss the similarities and differences below.
18
To control for “actor effects” we assigned two different participants to serve as the leader during each session, one
for the first half of the session and one for the second half. We analyzed the data to examine whether there were
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leader by informing participants that they would take a quiz, and that the two participants with
the highest quiz scores would serve as leaders for the remainder of the session. The remainder of
the instructions were identical to the above (i.e., they may consider the leader’s message but are
free to ignore it). The quiz tested participants’ knowledge on a topic they were likely to consider
of some importance – the results of the state-wide primary election that had recently occurred.
Prior research suggested that subjects would perceive one’s superior performance on a quiz as
entitling him or her to a position of authority within the experiment.19
Participants in the experiment were 103 undergraduate students who participated in
exchange for a $10 show-up fee. Of these, eight participants served as leaders, and so did not
play the Hawk/Dove game. On average, subjects earned $7 in addition to the showup fee. The
experiment lasted approximately one hour.
3. Hypotheses. The three expressive components of law we tested in this experiment were
ostension, intentionality, and minimal legitimacy. We hypothesized that each component would
uniquely contribute to the influence of expression on participants’ choice of strategy, as
compared to the control. Specifically, we hypothesized: (1) that participants in the treatment
conditions would be more likely to choose the recommended strategy than those in the control

significant differences in compliance based on leader identity; there were none.
Hoffman & Spitzer (1985) had subjects play a bargaining game in which the subject assigned as the “controller”
could determine the allocation that would occur if the subjects failed to reach agreement. The method of selecting the
controller influenced the subjects’ division of the gains from reaching agreement. Assigning the controller to the
subject who won a simple game, especially with instructions saying this subject had “earned” the position, produced
a division giving significantly more to the controller, compared to the condition where the assignment was based on
a coin flip. Similarly, Hoffman, et al. (1994) assigned subjects to a dictator game either randomly or according to a
general knowledge quiz. Only 20% of randomly selected dictators allocated $0 to their counterpart, but 40% of
dictators selected by high quiz score allocated $0 to their counterpart. Although these experiments necessarily
establish only that the person selected by his superior performance will feel entitled to the position to which he or she
is assigned, we believe it likely that other subjects will also share this view, and therefore that the leader selected by
merit will be perceived to have some minimal moral authority lacking in the randomly selected leader.

19
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(i.e., that expression influences behavior); and (2) that compliance would increase as the message
source reflected each additional expressive component (i.e., ostension < intentionality < minimal
legitimacy).
B. Results
We designate the strategy indicated by the spinner or the leaders for each round as the
focal strategy for that round. For convenience, we use the designation “focal strategy” even when
describing the control condition, where there was no expression to make a strategy focal. Thus, in
the control, “focal strategy” for round n means the strategy recommended in the expressive
conditions for round n. We then count an individual player’s strategy choice as “compliance” if it
corresponds to the focal strategy for that round. Recall that the focal message recommends one of
two sets of strategies: either that Player R play strategy 1 and Player C play strategy 2, or that
Player R play strategy 2 and Player C play strategy 1. Because we analyze the data at the level of
the individual player, we code as compliance the outcome where the individual player's chosen
strategy matches the focal strategy recommended for that individual (or in the control condition,
the strategy that would have been recommended had there been a message).
The mean rate of compliance across expressive treatments is illustrated in Table 2. Note
that the base rate for compliance in the absence of a message (in the Control condition) is .51,
meaning that players choose the same strategy as the one that would have been recommended by
the focal message (even in the absence of that message) about half the time.20 Table 2 also shows
that the rate of compliance appears to increase with the addition of each expressive component,
20

There are two possible explanations for why control condition subjects chose the focal strategy 50% of the time in
the absence of any message. One possibility is that control condition subjects were playing the mixed strategy
equilibrium for the game (described earlier in section III). Another possibility is that players were not guided by any
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as operationalized by each level of treatment. This trend appears to support the two hypotheses
set forth earlier: first, that participants in the treatment conditions are more likely to choose the
focal strategy than participants in the control condition (i.e., that expression influences
behavior),21 and second, that compliance increases as the message source reflects each additional
component.22
Table 2
Summary of Data: Compliance Rates Across Treatments and Rounds
Variable
Control (None)
Spinner (Ostension)

Mean Compliance Rate
.51
.65

Random Leader (Intentionality)

.74

Merit-Based Leader (Minimal Legitimacy)

.76

Round 1

.70

Round 2

.60

Round 3

.62

Round 4

.70

Round 5

.63

Round 6

.65

Round 7

.62

Round 8

.74

Round 9

.75

Total

.67

1. Hypothesis One (Control v. Treatment). To test whether the addition of expressive

strategy at all but instead were choosing haphazardly between the two choices. In any case, the important question
here (which we discuss later) is whether the provision of a message highlighting a particular strategy influences play.
21
Recall that, for convenience, we use the designation “focal strategy” even when describing the control condition,
where there was no expression to make a strategy focal.
22
Table 2 also reports rates of compliance within each individual round. Note that there appears to be no upward or
downward trend in compliance rates over rounds. We test this possibility of learning formally in the next section.
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components produced statistically reliable increases in compliance rates we estimated a series of
maximum-likelihood probit regressions. The main analysis of interest was whether the addition
of each expressive component (operationalized by message source) increased the likelihood of
compliance. We also tested a model that included dummy variables for each of the rounds of
play, to examine whether compliance changed over time. Each of these independent variables is
categorical, and the reported regression coefficients denote the change in the probability that the
dependent variable changes from 0 to 1 – that is, the change in probability of compliance. The
reported z-statistic (analogous to the t-statistic in ordinary least squares regression) represents the
ratio of the probit coefficient to its standard error.
First, we estimated a probit regression model to test the hypothesis that the players in the
three treatment conditions (taken together) are more likely to choose the focal strategy than
players in the control condition. Table 3 indicates that the Treatment variable is statistically
significant, and the hypothesis that participants in the treatment conditions were more likely to
choose the focal strategy than participants in the control condition is supported. Receiving a
message of any kind (whether by spinner, random leader, or legitimate leader) increases the
probability of choosing the focal strategy by .21, compared to receiving no message.
Table 3
Probit Analysis:
Effect of Focal Message Treatment on Compliance

Treatment

dF/dx

Robust SE

z

P > |z|

.212

.040

5.25

.000

NRWH/LNHOLKRRGUDWLRWHVWIRUWUHDWPHQWYDULDEOH 2   S! 2 = .000;
dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; z and P > z tests
whether the probit coefficient is equal to zero. N = 828; standard error is
adjusted for clustering around subject.

We next examined whether the influence of focal point treatment is robust to whether
25
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Hawk or Dove is the recommended strategy. It could be the case that expression influences
players’ behavior more strongly when recommending that they play Dove, or conversely, more
strongly when recommending that they play Hawk. We estimated a probit model that included
both the treatment variable and a dummy variable called “Hawk,” that is assigned the value of 1
when the focal strategy recommended that the player choose Hawk, and 0 otherwise. Model 1 in
Table 4 indicates that there was a significant difference in compliance when Hawk was the focal
strategy, so that players were less inclined to comply when Hawk was recommended compared to
when Dove was recommended. At the same time, the Treatment variable remains statistically
significant, so that there is greater likelihood of compliance in the Treatment conditions than
there is in the control condition, regardless of whether Hawk or Dove was the focal strategy. For
each of the focal strategies (Hawk and Dove), the message increased compliance compared to the
control condition.
Model 2 examines the interaction of Treatment (whether or not there was a message) and
Hawk (whether the message made Hawk focal or Dove focal). There was no statistically
significant Treatment x Hawk interaction, suggesting that the magnitude of influence of the
message in the Treatment conditions did not depend on whether Hawk or Dove was the focal
strategy. Instead, the message was equally as influential when Hawk was the focal strategy as
when Dove was the focal strategy – a desirable property for coordination of behavior. Finally, the
addition of dummy variables for Round in Model 3 allows us to show that the Treatment effect
remains robust while controlling for any possible effects attributable to round of play, a topic to
which we return later.
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Table 4
Probit Analysis:
Effect of Focal Message Treatment, Message, and Rounds on Compliance
Model

DF/dx

Robust SE

Z

P > |z|

1

Treatment
Hawk

.217
-.138

.039
.053

5.46
-2.61

.000
.009

2

Treatment
Hawk
Trtmt x
Hawk

.259
-.073

.080
.115

3.26
-0.64

.001
.524

-.088

.132

-0.67

.501

Treatment
Hawk
Trtmt x
Hawk
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Round 4
Round 5
Round 6
Round 8
Round 9

.263
-.104

.082
.118

3.25
-0.88

.001
.380

-.088

.132

-0.67

.500

.151
.068
.082
.146
.094
.112
.187
.196

.060
.070
.065
.063
.063
.066
.057
.056

2.17
0.92
1.20
2.02
1.38
1.54
2.64
2.79

.030
.359
.229
.044
.167
.123
.008
.005

3

Next, we estimated a model that included dummy variables for each of the treatment
conditions (spinner, random leader, merit-based leader), as well as dummy variables for each of
the periods of play. This model allows us to separately compare each of the components of
expressive influence to the control condition. The addition of the dummy variables for Round
again allows us to examine whether such effects remain robust while controlling for any possible
effects attributable to round of play. Table 5 indicates statistically significant effects for each of
the three components of expression that were operationalized in the treatment conditions.
Compared to the control condition, the probability of choosing the focal strategy increases by .13
when that strategy is made focal through ostension alone (spinner); the probability increases by
.21 when that strategy is made focal through ostension and intentionality (random leader); and
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the probability increases by .23 when that strategy is made focal through ostension, intentionality,
and minimal legitimacy (merit-based leader).23
Table 5
Probit Analysis:
Effect of Individual Focal Message Treatments and Rounds on Compliance
Model
1

2

Ostension (Spinner)
Intentionality (Random Leader)
Minimal Legitimacy (Merit-Based
Leader)
Ostension (Spinner)
Intentionality (Random Leader)
Minimal Legitimacy (Merit-Based
Leader)
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Round 4
Round 5
Round 6
Round 7
Round 8

dF/dx

Robust SE

Z

P > |z|

.131
.209

.040
.045

3.08
3.89

.002
.000

.226

.041

4.72

.000

.132
.211

.040
.046

3.08
3.86

.002
.000

.227

.041

4.70

.000

-.060
-.168
-.145
-.062
-.134
-.109
-.144
-.012

.073
.069
.081
.071
.068
.074
.084
.075

-0.84
-2.54
-1.84
-0.90
-2.01
-1.53
-1.76
-0.16

.400
.011
.066
.369
.044
.127
.079
.872

Note: LiNHOLKRRGUDWLRWHVWIRU5RXQGYDULDEOHV 2   S!
= 828; standard error is adjusted for clustering around subject.

2

= .020. N

23

Note that the dF/dx marginal effects illustrated in Table 5 are very close to differences suggested by the sample
means in Table 2. For example, Table 2 suggests a .14 increase in probability of playing the focal strategy in the
spinner condition compared to the control condition, a marginal effect very close to that indicated by the .132 dF/dx
coefficient for Spinner in Table 5. The marginal effects of Random Leader and Merit-Based Leader shown in Table
5 are also close to the differences in the respective means depicted in Table 2. These similarities suggest that even
after controlling for the effects of Round (recall that a few of the coefficients were statistically significant), the
treatment coefficients (for Spinner, Random Leader, and Merit-Based Leader) remain essentially unchanged.
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2. Round Effects. The model in Table 5 includes dummy variables for individual rounds
of play.24 The probit coefficients for a few of the individual round dummies are statistically
significant. In this model, Round 9 is the omitted variable, so that in Rounds 2 and 5 the
probability of compliance is less than in Round 9. However, there does not seem to be any
discernible trend of increasing or decreasing probability of compliance across rounds. Most
important, the treatment dummies are still significant even with the round dummies included in
the model, indicating that the effect of treatment is robust to any influence of round.
3. Hypothesis Two (Ostention v. Intentionality v. Minimal Legitimacy). We next tested the
hypothesis that compliance increases as the message source reflects each additional expressive
component. More specifically, we tested the claim that the probability of choosing the focal
strategy is higher when that strategy is made focal through intentionality and ostension (random
leader) than through ostension alone (spinner); and that the probability of choosing the focal
strategy is higher when it is made focal through minimal legitimacy, intentionality, and ostension
(merit-based leader) than through ostension alone (spinner) or intentionality and ostension
(random leader). Tests of equality of the probit coefficients (Table 6) indicate that there was a
statistically significant difference between spinner and legitimate leader, a marginally significant
difference between spinner and random leader, and no detectable difference between random
leader and legitimate leader. The hypothesis that addition of each expressive component
increases compliance was only partially supported.

24

Recall that players played about 9 rounds of the game, each against a different opponent.

29

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Table 6
Focal Message Treatments: Tests for Equality of Probit Coefficients
Random Leader 6SLQQHU

(1)
2.30

3!
.129

Merit-Based Leader 6SLQQHU

4.11

.043

Merit-Based Leader 5DQGRP/HDGHU

0.07

.791

2

2

Finally, we examined players’ attitudes about their counterparts’ strategy choices. After
the last round of the game we administered a questionnaire designed to measure attitudes toward
the game and individual characteristics that might have influenced their choices.25 Participants
indicated on a 7-point scale their attitudes about the fairness of their opponents’ choices (1=
extremely unfair; 7 = extremely fair). We found that whenever the counterpart chose the focal
strategy, this was perceived on average as more fair (M = 5.30) than choosing the non-focal
strategy (M = 4.54); (t(72) = 3.98; p < .001). We also found that when the counterpart
disregarded the focal strategy, the magnitude of perceived unfairness depended on whether Hawk
or Dove was the focal strategy. Specifically, when the focal strategy for the counterpart was Dove
but the counterpart ignored the message and played Hawk, this was perceived as considerably
less fair than when the reverse occurred (focal strategy was Hawk and counterpart played
Dove).26 It appears that playing Dove is perceived as basically fair regardless of the message, but

25

None of the individual characteristics we measured predicted choices in the game, so we omit these results for
purposes of brevity.

26

To analyze this question, we first computed a difference score by subtracting fairness of playing Hawk when not
recommended (1=Extremely Unfair; 7=Extremely Fair) from fairness of playing Hawk when recommended (M =
1.15). We computed a similar difference score for fairness of playing Dove (M = 0.36). We then used a paired t-test
to analyze whether there was a difference between these two difference scores. The difference was significant. t(72)=
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playing Hawk is perceived as fair only when authorized by the message.
C. Discussion
The results suggest that third-party cheap talk can, by itself, influence the behavior of
individuals in a HD Game. The results are robust across the recommendation (Hawk or Dove)
and across round (1-9). That something as arbitrary as a spinner made subjects more likely to
choose a particular strategy, compared to the control, suggests that expression can influence
behavior ostensively.27 Merely pointing to an equilibrium appears to increase the salience of that
choice, which increases the likelihood that players will choose the strategies producing that
equilibrium. That players are likely to choose a strategy that the spinner obviously selects at
random suggests that expression influences behavior even when it lacks legitimacy or
intentionality. Law influences behavior in many ways, but we infer from this result that, at the
most basic level, law also influences behavior ostensively. That is, in coordination situations, law
works in part by merely pointing to the prescribed outcome.
When the source of expression was a leader, there was an additional influence of
expression on players’ choices, over and above the ostensive influence of the spinner. Although
-4.07; p < .001.
27

There remains a question of the precise mechanism that produces the behavioral influence. Salience might work
unreflectively, merely because it causes a certain strategy to be “on the mind” of each subject, or reflectively,
because it also causes each subject to expect their counterpart to play the salient strategy. These possibilities
correspond to what Mehta et al. 1994 respectively term as “primary” and “secondary” salience. The well-known
Anchoring and Adjustment experiment by Tversky & Kahneman 1982 may be interpreted as showing that a random
device can work via primary salience. They used a “wheel of fortune” displaying numbers to influence the estimates
subjects made in answering quantitative questions. The random number displayed immediately before subjects gave
an answer influenced the answer even though it was logically irrelevant. Our experiment does not involve an
adjustment process by which the subjects understand that the salient choice is incorrect and insufficiently adjust
away from the incorrect choice. Nonetheless, because expectations about other’s behavior were irrelevant to
answering the questions posed, the Tversky & Kahneman study suggests that salience can work without affecting
such expectations. By contrast, Mehta et al. 1994 find that when subjects have an incentive to coordinate, they
reason about what others will find salient. Thus, in our experiment, it seems likely that the expression works via
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there was no detectable28 marginal increase in influence of random leader over spinner - mere
intentionality adding little to ostension in influencing compliance – there was an increase
between merit-based leader over spinner. Apparently, the process of selecting the leader by a quiz
on recent political events was sufficient to endow the leader with some minimal form of
perceived legitimacy, either because the process was deemed more “fair” or the leader was
perceived as more competent or credible. There was no difference between the random and
merit-based leader, but it seems plausible that a stronger, more comprehensive manipulation of
legitimacy than our political quiz might increase compliance considerably, perhaps significantly
more than a random leader.
Finally, it is intriguing that subjects so readily came to equate “fairness” with playing the
recommended strategy, even when the recommendation came arbitrarily from a spinner and
despite the abstract context of the interaction. We can speculate why. As noted above, all the
subjects improve their ex ante (but not ex post) payoffs if they all coordinate their strategies with
a random event they both observe, like the spinner, thereby avoiding the possibility of a
Hawk/Hawk outcome. We think it possible that many subjects recognized this fact and perceived
the method for maximizing their joint returns as “fair.” As a result, subjects may have perceived
as “unfair” the non-compliance that produces or risks the Hawk/Hawk outcome, i.e., where one
plays Hawk contrary to the third-party message. If so, then the experiment suggests an insight
into one source of law’s “legitimacy” (even though our primary focus is a compliance
mechanism other than legitimacy). In situations involving coordination, legitimacy may arise, not
because law embodies a community’s moral norms, nor because a democratic process produces
secondary salience, by influencing expectations of what other subjects will do.
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the law, but because law provides an arbitrary way to coordinate strategies. It is not (or not
merely) that the law reminds or persuades people of their moral obligations, but that people feel
obligated in coordination situations to do whatever is, by virtue of its salience, expected of them.

V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we argue that coordination situations involving conflict frequently occur in
the real world, and that law can potentially influence behavior in these situations by constructing
a focal point. As other public rituals generate common knowledge (Chwe 2001), we have
plausibly assumed that law is frequently capable of drawing attention to the equilibrium outcome
it prescribes. By publicly announcing a state of affairs (e.g., “No Smoking Here”) law can make
one of the multiple equilibria salient. We tested whether third-party expression can, by making an
outcome salient, influence the behavior of the players in the game. In the Hawk-Dove game we
used, each player preferred a different equilibrium from his counterpart. Yet despite this conflict,
a third party’s “mere” cheap talk significantly influenced the players’ behavior. Thus, if
coordination problems of the kind modeled by the Hawk-Dove game are common, and if law
tends to draw attention to the outcome it prescribes, then law works, in part, by creating a focal
point. Sanctions and legitimacy do not exhaust the mechanisms by which law influences
behavior.
More specifically, we tested how certain features of cheap talk contribute to its ability to
influence behavior. Most of the expressive power we discovered exists in the most minimal
expressive condition we tested: when an explicitly random mechanical device “points to” a

28

The apparent marginal increase did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.
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symbol of one or another equilibrium. Adding the component of intentionality by having a
randomly selected leader deliver the message did not reliably enhance the influence of the
message. But adding a minimal form of legitimacy, by using a merit-based process for selecting
the leader who delivers the message, did reliably enhance its influence. Finally, we find that
subjects are quick to equate “fairness” with an individual’s playing Dove when the message so
indicates.
The experiment we report represents only an initial effort to test the focal effects of law.
Although the experimental setting is highly stylized, the method is highly appropriate for a first
test of the law’s expressive influence, because it is so difficult in the real world to separate that
influence from the influence of sanctions and legitimacy. Moreover, the use of experimental
methods allows us to manipulate precisely the source of influence on behavior (even isolating
individual components of expressive influences), and therefore to make strong causal inferences
about the influence of expression on behavior. Nonetheless, our experimental results leave open
substantial questions for future research. One might test the robustness of the basic findings in
divergent strategic settings – different games, payoffs, information sets, etc. One could usefully
test whether ostension works merely through primary (unreflective) salience or because it makes
players form new expectations about what the other player will do. And it would be productive to
introduce additional components of legal expression. In particular, one might seek to test whether
the ostensive influence we identify remains powerful when compared to leaders endowed with a
stronger form of legitimacy.
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